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Prospects and Challenges 
of a Pan-European Post-Trade Infrastructure 
Karel Lannoo and Diego Valiante 
fter more than a decade of indecision, the EU is finally now set to implement a consistent regulatory 
architecture for clearing and settlement. Following the agreement on a European market infrastructure 
Regulation  (EMIR),  the  European  Commission  has  proposed  harmonised  rules  for  centralised 
settlement depositaries (CSDs), while the European Central Bank (ECB) is moving forward with its plans for a 
central eurozone settlement engine. After the regrettable circumvention of the 2006 Code of Conduct, the EU 
will now have a consistent framework allowing cross-border provision of services by and competition among 
clearing and settlement entities in the EU, with rules ensuring open access and interoperability. This situation 
will bring about a sea change in the sector, leading to further consolidation at European level, as we have also 
witnessed in the area of trading platforms since the adoption of the investment services Directive in 1993 and 
MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive) in 2007. But important challenges remain in striking a 
balance between market efficiency and financial stability. 
 
Introduction 
The  move  to  require  central  clearing  of  derivatives 
trading  is  a  response  to  major  failures  on  non-
collateralised  positions  in  bilateral  OTC  (over-the-
counter) derivatives trading, mainly with the US group 
AIG,  which  sparked  systemic  disruption  across  the 
globe and led to a costly bail-out by US taxpayers in 
2008. The need to put in place effective safeguards to 
deal with counterparty risk in derivatives trading was a 
key  element  of  the  London  and  Pittsburgh  G-20 
meetings.  The  Pittsburgh  G-20  decided  that  “all 
standardized  OTC  derivative  contracts  should  be 
traded  on  exchanges  or  electronic  trading  platforms, 
where  appropriate,  and  cleared  through  central 
counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. Non-centrally 
cleared  contracts  should  be  subject  to  higher  capital 
requirements.”
1 In addition, it was decided that OTC 
derivatives  contracts  should  be  reported  to  trade 
repositories. The opaqueness surrounding bilateral net 
exposures  of  systemically  important  financial 
institutions (SIFIs) induced risk aversion and froze the 
interbank market, with broader implications for credit 
markets at global level (Valiante, 2010). 
                                                   
1  Leaders  Statement,  2009  G-20  Pittsburgh  Summit,  24-25 
September 2009, p. 9. 
Together  with  the  reinforcement  of  bank  capital, 
mandatory central clearing of OTC derivatives is one 
of  the  most  important  shifts  brought  about  by  the 
financial  crisis,  although  many  questions  yet  remain 
about their impact. The capacity of the infrastructure to 
clear millions of transactions and to facilitate collateral 
and  counterparty  risk  management  in  order  to 
minimise adverse effects on credit availability is only 
part  of  the  challenge.  It  may  also  be  necessary  for 
competition authorities to  more  deeply scrutinise the 
effects  on  market  structure,  due  to  the  unavoidable 
consolidation  process  to  reach  critical  mass.  In 
addition,  there  is  the  objective  to  create  centralised 
repositories for all OTC derivatives trades. Initiatives 
in  the  settlement  arena,  by  both  the  European 
Commission and the ECB, were already on the agenda 
well before the financial crisis hit, but the resolve to go 
for  harmonised  rules  and  a  single  settlement  engine 
crystallised as a result. 
This paper analyses three components of the new post-
trade  infrastructure  measures:  1)  the  regulatory 
framework  for  and  supervision  of  central 
counterparties  (CCPs)  under  the  new  EMIR 
legislation, 2) the authorisation requirements of trade 
repositories and 3) the draft CSD Regulation and the 
progress  with  the  ECB’s  Target  2  Securities  (T2S) 
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project. It then discusses the impact of the new rules, 
and argues that, analogous to the unexpected impact of 
MiFID  on  trading  infrastructures,  a  similar  EMIR 
revolution may be on its way. This should allow us to 
see  the  effects  of  the  new  rules  from  another 
perspective. 
The anatomy of EMIR 
Under  the  new  regulation,  CCPs  will  play  a  central 
role  in  the  financial  system,  but  their  impact  will 
primarily affect only a few players in the market. The 
OTC derivatives market on both sides of the Atlantic 
has  so  far  been  dominated  by  nine  players,  which 
control more than 80% of the market (Valiante, 2010). 
The explicit and implicit costs of participating in CCPs 
and the resulting impact on their profitability are key 
factors  for  these  players,  as  well  as  the  related 
reduction  in  systemic  risk.  The  question  remains 
whether  risk  will  be  better  controlled  when 
‘multilateralised’  and  internalised  within  a  limited 
number  of CCPs, compared to the former regime  of 
essentially bilateral exposure.  
For  central  clearing  to  occur,  much  depends  on  the 
eligibility  of  OTC  derivatives,  which  is  assumed  to 
account  for  around  2/3  of  the  market,  and  the 
governance  and  control  of  CCPs.
2  For  instance,  off-
loading contracts that are deemed ‘liquid’ (in line with 
the  current  ESMA  draft  Regulatory  Technical 
Standards  on  eligibility  requirements
3)  may  leave 
bilateral derivatives markets with ‘tail-risk’ exposures, 
which can significantly affect markets and increase the 
risks to be assumed by financial institutions. Inevitably 
the cost of bilateral trading of complex products that 
cannot  be  cleared  on  highly  standardised  platforms 
will increase. 
In its final text, EMIR remains very much at the level 
of  principles  in  determining  the  eligibility  of 
derivatives  for  central  clearing  and  the  prudential 
requirements.
4 As shown in Table 1, however, the text 
has doubled in length compared to the Commission’s 
draft,  mainly  as  a  result  of  the  addition  of  many 
exemptions from the scope of the Regulation (namely 
hedging and intra-group transactions, foreign exchange 
and pension  funds) and  clarification  of third-country 
provisions.  Moreover,  much  remains  to  be  done  in 
implementing  rules:  40  of  the  77  items  on  ESMA’s 
                                                   
2 Today, some 39% of OTC derivatives are centrally cleared 
(see Deutsche Bank, 2012, p. 10).  
3 In assessing the eligibility of OTC derivatives, ESMA takes as 
guiding  principles  (Art.  6.1(a)(b),  p.  79,  ESMA,  2012),  the 
legal  and  operational  standardisation  (common  legal 
documentation  and  automated  post-trade  processing)  and  the 
volumes  and  liquidity  testing  (in  case  a  counterparty  would 
default). 
4 Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories, OJ L 201 of 27.7 2012. 
2012  work  programme  concern  EMIR.
5  This 
proliferation of rules is a trend that can be observed 
with  other  post-crisis  financial  regulation  measures; 
the question remains what their long-term impact will 
be.  
Table 1. A comparison of the original EMIR proposal 
and final draft 
  Number of 
articles 








72  20  19,465 
EMIR final 
level 1  91  24  43,101 
 
Non-financial  corporations  and  pension  funds  are 
exempt  (for  a  three-year  transition  period)  from  the 
scope of the Regulation. This former exemption was 
already  on  the  agenda  well  before  the  text  was 
formally  proposed,  and  has  been  maintained,  albeit 
with the maintenance of a clearing threshold. The same 
applies in the US under the Dodd-Frank bill, which is 
only expected to come into effect in the second half of 
2013. The exemption for pension funds is regarded as 
a major success of lobbying efforts with the European 
Parliament, but it does not apply in the US.  
The exemption of non-financial corporations from the 
scope  of  the  regulation  applies  below  a  clearing 
threshold of €1 billion for credit and equity derivatives 
and €3 billion for currency, interest rate, commodity 
and other OTC derivatives (Art. 10, EMIR; Art. 10, p. 
82, ESMA, 2012). In addition, transactions that reduce 
risks  directly  related  to  the  commercial  or  treasury-
financing  activities  of  non-financial  entities,  the  so-
called ‘hedging transactions’ (Art. 10.3, EMIR), will 
not  qualify  for  the  clearing  threshold.  Following 
ESMA  standards  (Art.  9.1  (a)(b)(c),  p.  82,  ESMA, 
2012;  based  on  Art.  10.3,  EMIR),  ‘hedging’  may 
assume a broad meaning, i.e. all transactions that are 
done  in  order to indirectly  or  directly  mitigate price 
risk,  or  are  compliant  with  IFRS  standards  (Art.  3, 
Regulation No. 1606/2002).  
The  exemption  of  pension  schemes  from  central 
clearing is less clear cut, as it is only applicable for a 
three-year  transition  period.  Representatives  of 
pension schemes successfully argued that the margin 
requirements of CCPs would reduce returns for future 
retirees. However, pension schemes will be subject to 
reporting  obligations  and  bilateral  collateralisation 
requirements. “The ultimate aim  is, however, central 
clearing as soon as this is tenable” (recital 26, EMIR). 
This  derogation  also  applies  to  group  insurance 
                                                   
5  One  article  may  include  more  than  one  reference  to 
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schemes,  provided  they  are  ring-fenced  from  other 
activities within the insurance group (Art. 2.10(c)).  
Bilateral  contracts  that  are  not  centrally  cleared  are 
subject  to  strict  risk-management  procedures  and 
operational  requirements  (such  as  portfolio 
reconciliation and affirmation/confirmation systems).
6 
The value of outstanding contracts shall be marked-to-
market on a daily basis, except if the market is inactive 
(i.e. a quoted price is not readily available or fair value 
estimates  are  too  divergent  (Art.  15,  p.  85,  ESMA, 
2012). ESMA would then need to refer to marking-to-
model  criteria  (Art.  16,  p.  85,  ESMA,  2012),  using 
‘accepted’ economic methodologies. 
Authorisation and operational requirements 
for CCPs 
EMIR follows a dual approach for the authorisation of 
CCPs. EU-based CCPs are authorised by the relevant 
authorities  in  their  home  country.  Authorised  third-
country CCPs can be recognised to do business in the 
EU by ESMA, subject to an equivalence decision by 
the European Commission and an ESMA cooperation 
agreement  with  the  respective  home  supervisory 
authority on the exchange of information (Art. 25.2(c)) 
and an ‘equivalent’ system of anti-money laundering 
and terrorist financing rules.  
Once  the  initial  conditions  have  been  met, 
clearinghouses  will  be  able  to  offer  their  services 
freely within the EU, after notifying the host-country 
authorities.  So  far,  further  to  MiFID  (Art.  34), 
investment  firms  could  have  access  to  host-country 
clearing  and  settlement  services,  but  the  latter  could 
not provide their services freely across borders, which 
is what EMIR and the draft CSD regulation are now 
putting in place.  
The  basic  prudential  and  business  conduct  standards 
for CCPs today comprise: 
1.  An  ‘adequate’  capitalisation  of  at  least  €7.5 
million, ‘proportional’ to the risk taken by the CCP 
(Art. 16),
7 
2.  Exposure  management,  margining  rules,  default 
fund, collateralisation and investment policy (Arts 
40-47) and 
                                                   
6  Another  important  service  is  compression,  which  allows 
netted  positions  to  be  further  reduced  (early  termination) 
against each other at an agreed mark-to-market valuation of the 
contract (Art. 3 RM, ESMA, 2012). 
7  It  should  be  proportional  to  the  “risk  stemming  from  the 
activities of the CCP” (recital 48, and Art. 16.2). This is a very 
open clause, which – for CCPs licensed as bank – could also 
create  conflicts  with  current  capital  requirements.  The 
European Banking Authority (EBA) will need to set regulatory 
technical standards for this. CCPs could also be subject to other 
regulations governing capital requirements. 
3.  Governance and conduct requirements (segregated 
and portable individual client accounts, conflicts-
of-interest rules, outsourcing policy) (Arts 33-39). 
These rules, and above all those under item (2), are key 
elements ensuring the correct functioning of CCPs, but 
they  also  serve  to  assuage  the  doubts  that  remain 
among specialists regarding the resilience of CCPs. No 
less than 11 out of 41 EMIR items in ESMA’s 2012 
regulatory work programme relate to the substantiation 
of these prudential rules.  
As  regards  capital  requirements  for  CCPs,  another 
body,  the  European  Banking  Authority  (EBA)  is 
required to draft regulatory technical standards (RTSs), 
which  were  published  in  September.  Regulatory 
capital  will  be  required  to  cover  gross  operational 
expenses for winding down and restructuring of CCPs. 
On  top  of  this,  capital  will  be  required  to  cover 
operational,  legal,  and  non-covered  credit, 
counterparty and market risks (Art. 3-6, EBA, 2012). 
Calculations will be done in accordance with the ‘risk-
weighted assets’ methodology of the EU’s two main 
capital  requirements  Directives  (2006/48/EC  and 
2006/49/EC). LCH Clearnet (2012) has estimated the 
need for additional capital up to €375  million.  As a 
consequence  of  market  infrastructure  surveillance, 
access  to  central  bank  liquidity,  and  capital 
requirement  regulation,  CCPs  fall  under  the 
supervision  of  three  European  authorities  –  ESMA, 
EBA and the ECB – apart from the local authority. 
The  question  originally raised by the ECB  of  where 
CCPs should be  located (within  or  outside the  main 
currency area) is still pending. Where a CCP is located 
relates to the situation in which a CCP fails and needs 
central  bank  liquidity  support  to  keep  the  financial 
system functioning in an orderly manner. Who should 
be  in charge  in case of a liquidity crisis: the central 
bank  where  the  CCP  is  headquartered  with  its  main 
operations, or perhaps the central bank where the main 
financial  entities  of  the  CCP  are  based  or  the  main 
currency  cleared?  In  effect,  EMIR  cannot  force  the 
European  Central  Bank  and  its  network  (ESCB)  to 
intervene,  but  recitals  11  and  53  emphasise  the 
ESCB’s  important  role  in  licensing,  supervising  and 
supporting the clearing and settlement system. ESMA 
had to work very closely with the ECB in drafting the 
above-mentioned regulatory technical standards.
8 As a 
result, CCPs may have access to central bank liquidity 
and will settle in central bank money. In this context, it 
should be recalled that the UK Treasury has brought 
                                                   
8 It should be recalled that the discussions on this item between 
the ECB and CESR, the predecessor of ESMA, have a long 
history.  They started in 2001 and broke down in 2005  for a 
period of about three years until the EU Finance Ministers were 
mandated in the context of the financial crisis to resume their 
work,  leading  to  the  ECB-CESR  recommendations  of  June 
2009  (see  http://www.ecb.eu/paym/pol/secover/escbcesr/ 
html/index.en.html). 4 |Lannoo & Valiante 
the ECB before the EU Court of Justice on grounds 
that its location policy rules requiring clearinghouses 
that deal with more than 5% euro-based transactions to 
move within the eurozone, violate single market rules. 
Finally, aside from the moral hazard posed simply by 
the  involvement  of  the  ECB  in  the  supervision  of  a 
CCP,  it  is  also  unclear  what  form  a  potential 
intervention by a central bank would take in the event 
of a CCP failure. Would the ECB intervene to inject 
liquidity (as capital or credit line) in a CCP even if the 
problem was caused by the counterparty default of a 
US legal (whether the clearing member is a subsidiary 
or  a  branch)?  This  situation  could  be  highly 
controversial. Three steps are possible in this case: 1) 
the central bank where the CCP is operating could step 
in and directly inject liquidity in the CCP, regardless 
of  the  composition  and  nationality  of  its  clearing 
members (location then plays a key role), 2) the central 
bank  of the  main currency traded  on the CCP could 
inject liquidity directly in the CCP or 3) MoUs among 
central  banks  could  actually  regulate  a  common 
intervention  based  on  the  percentage  of  the  default 
fund held by clearing members operating in the central 
bank’s  jurisdiction  or  under  its  supervision.  For 
instance,  if  US  clearing  members’  subsidiaries  hold 
only  10%  of  the  default  fund,  in  case  of  liquidity 
problems, the FED would only inject liquidity equal to 
10% of the total amount requested. 
Open access and interoperability 
For cash securities (recital 73),
9 CCPs may enter into 
interoperability arrangements, provided certain criteria 
are  met  (Arts  51-53).  These  include  interoperability 
with other CCPs and non-discriminatory data access to 
trading  venues  and  settlement  systems  (Art.  51.2). 
ESMA will need to report by the end of 2014 on the 
appropriateness  of  the  extension  of  these 
interoperability arrangements to non-cash securities. In 
any  case,  counterparties  can  voluntarily  enter  into  a 
bilateral  interoperability  agreement  for  non-cash 
securities, to be agreed by the authorities.  
The interoperability agreements  will be approved by 
national  authorities,  but  ultimately  ESMA  can  only 
issue a non-binding opinion (reconsidering clause) in 
case  disagreement  persists  between  the  financial 
authority granting/denying approval and the financial 
authority  where the CCP is located (Art. 54.3). This 
lack of power may affect the implementation of this 
requirement if the dispute among national authorities is 
not resolved by ESMA’s moral suasion, especially if 
ESMA  perceives  that  the  national  authority  has  not 
correctly  interpreted  the  requirements  set  by  the 
regulation. 
                                                   
9  It  is  worth  noting  that  EMIR  defines  cash  securities  as 
“transferable securities and money market instruments”. 
Arts 7 and 8 and recital 34 of EMIR set a ‘reverse’ 
open-access principle, also included in the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR, Arts 28 and 
29),  but  they  are  applicable  to  all  financial 
instruments.
10  As  a  result,  a  competing  CCP  would 
obtain access to data feed from the incumbent trading 
venue to  offer  clearing services  in competition, and, 
vice-versa,  the  incumbent  CCP  must  agree  to  clear 
transactions  executed  in  different  trading  venues,  to 
allow competing trading venues to compete with the 
incumbent  trading  platform  on  reasonable  terms. 
Access to these services should be non-discriminatory, 
and it should not create the need for interoperability or 
liquidity  fragmentation.
11  In  case  one  of  these  two 
conditions  obtain,  the  incumbent  can  deny  access. 
Even  if  the  ‘liquidity  fragmentation’  condition  has 
been  clearly  defined  by  ESMA,  the  requirements 
establishing  when  open  access  may  need 
interoperability are unclear, which may leave space for 
market  players  to  claim  an  arbitrary  need  to  be 
interoperable in order to deny access (whether this is 
actually true or not). 
In addition, it is difficult to imagine CCPs competing 
without  interoperability  agreements  in  place,  as  this 
would  imply  fragmenting  pools  of  collateral  into 
vertical infrastructures and ultimately increasing costs. 
The risk of locking the system into separate pools of 
collateral that cannot be consolidated may drastically 
reduce the efficiency (and ultimately the stability) of 
the financial system. However, it is difficult to achieve 
interoperability for derivatives because of the varying 
nature  and  characteristics  of  these  transactions. 
Against this background, technologies in this area are 
quickly  progressing,  and  competition  among  CCPs 
will  certainly  escalate  in  the  near  future  around  the 
provision of services that can improve the management 
of collateral and generate important savings for end-
users,  ultimately  leading  to  a  more  interoperable 
environment. 
Trade repositories  
A second part of EMIR deals with the registration and 
operation  of  trade  repositories  (TRs).  These  entities 
centrally  collect  and  maintain  the  records  of  any 
derivative  contract  that  has  been  concluded  and  any 
modification  or  termination  of  the  contract.  All 
derivative  contracts  must  be  reported  to  a  trade 
repository  within  one  business  day  from  the  day  of 
execution (T+1). This applies to both cleared and non-
cleared  trades,  listed  and  OTC  derivatives  and  to 
outstanding and pre-enacted swaps. This report must 
                                                   
10 According to the current version of the text under discussion 
in the European Parliament. 
11 Following ESMA (Art. 8, p. 81, ESMA, 2012), there is no 
“liquidity  fragmentation”  if  there  is  at  least  one  CCP  in 
common  (after  the  competing  CCP  is  allowed  to  enter)  and 
there are already clearing arrangements established by the CCP. Prospects & challenges of a pan-European post-trade infrastructure |5 
 
specify the parties to and the main characteristics of 
the contract.  
So  far,  limited  information  is  available  on  the 
outstanding  OTC  derivatives  contracts,  and  for 
existing  contracts,  no  harmonised  international 
standards  were  in  place.  Opaqueness  in  derivatives 
markets caused disruptive adverse selection effects in 
the  interbank  market,  following  Lehman  Brothers’ 
bankruptcy. Only one TR, the US DTCC, had been in 
existence  before  the  financial  crisis,  covering  only 
credit derivatives. Several new initiatives, however – 
such as the Regis TR (a joint initiative of Iberclear and 
Clearstream)  –  have  been  launched  in  the  meantime 
and have recently started operations. 
Trade repositories  will be authorised by ESMA, and 
thereby  become,  after  rating  agencies,  the  second 
specific entity to be supervised exclusively by ESMA. 
In  return  for  performing  this  function,  ESMA  will 
charge  fees  to  the  repositories,  which  should  fully 
cover  its  expenses. ESMA  may  delegate supervisory 
tasks  to  the  member  state  authorities.  Trade 
repositories  from  third  countries  may  also  be 
recognised, as soon as an equivalence agreement with 
the country in question has been concluded (Art. 75). 
As  for  other  new  EU  directives  (e.g.  Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers Directive), the use  of an 
‘equivalence’  regime  raises  questions  concerning 
which criteria will be used to determine equivalence. 
An excessively strict equivalence regime would ring-
fence  EU  markets  and  affect  linkages  with  non-EU 
counterparties,  while  too  lax  an  equivalence  regime 
would create space for regulatory arbitrage. 
For a proper supervisory framework to work, ESMA 
needs  to  have  the  powers  to  conduct  general 
investigations, do on-site inspections of and eventually 
impose fines on trade repositories. This is a fairly new 
concept in a European context, although it also already 
appears  in  the  rating  agencies  Regulation.  Data 
collected  by  TRs  should  be  made  available  to  the 
relevant European and national supervisory authorities.  
Notwithstanding  the  formal  obligation  to  report,  the 
market  for  TRs  may  remain  small  and  highly 
concentrated.  This  market  is,  like  the  market  for 
market data, global, with high economies of scale and 
only  a  few  dominant  players.  TRs  should  be 
interconnected  and  exchange  information,  with 
regulators  defining  mandatory  formats  ensuring  that 
TRs  are  capable  of  communicating  with  each  other 
(Benito, 2012). It remains to be seen whether this will 
actually  happen,  as  the  market  data  world  has  been 
grappling with this issue for a long time, without much 
progress.  Commercial  interests  in  setting  joint 
standards  and  exchanging  information  may  be 
minimal, which is fully recognised in the EMIR text 
(recital  42).  To  counter  this  tendency,  TRs  should 
provide  information  on  non-discriminatory  terms, 
while  regulation  should  clearly  define  how  much 
information TRs can retain for commercial purposes 
(analytical  data  services)  and  how  much  should  be 
disclosed to the market. The presence of multiple TRs, 
adopting the same standards and sharing information 
in order to reconcile a global picture of the market can 
promote  further  competition  among  them  in  the 
provision  of  additional  services  to  support  middle-
office  operations  (e.g.  confirmation)  and  collateral 
services  (e.g.  compression  and  real-time  risk 
management), or just reporting services to regulators. 
In addition, TRs could also collect data in other less 
transparent areas, such as securities lending and repo 
operations,  where  transparency  today  is  based  on 
surveys  and  voluntary  bilateral  agreements  between 
dealers and data vendors. 
The CSD proposal and T2S progress 
Following  EMIR,  the  single  license  facilities  should 
also  apply  to  central  securities  depositaries  (CSDs), 
which  hitherto  has  only  been  subject  to  a  self-
regulatory Code. While the Code made some progress 
in the area of price transparency, hard-core issues such 
as  interoperability  and  service  unbundling  have  not 
advanced, as too much was at stake for the operators. 
The  new  draft  Regulation  defines  settlement,  the 
settlement cycle (T+2) and settlement discipline, with 
penalties for settlement failures. It requires transparent 
access  criteria,  price  and  fee  transparency,  and 
interoperability  between  CSDs  and  with  other 
infrastructures,  such  as  CCPs  (chapter  IV).  An 
‘equivalence’  regime  for  recognition  to  provide 
services in the European Union, as for EMIR, applies 
to third-country CSDs.
12 
The  CSD  proposal  establishes  for  the  first  time 
harmonised  prudential  rules  for  CSDs  in  the  EU. 
Although general global standards have existed since 
2002, and were recently updated by the Committee on 
Payment  and  Settlement  Systems  (CPSS)  and  the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO)  in  a  report  entitled  “The  principles  for 
financial market infrastructures”,
13 the EU had so far 
left  this  to  the  member  states,  which  has  hampered 
cross-border  provision  of  settlement  services.  The 
proposal sets harmonised organisational requirements, 
conduct-of-business  rules,  rules  for  other  CSD 
services,  prudential  standards  and  requirements  for 
links with other CSDs. Authorisation is in the hands of 
the  member  states,  with  ESMA  placed  in  charge  of 
maintaining  a  CSD  register.  The  draft  also  requires 
member states to provide for a harmonised minimum 
level  of  administrative  sanctions  (including 
                                                   
12 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on improving securities settlement in the European 
Union  and  on  central  securities  depositories  (CSDs)  and 
amending Directive 98/26/EC, 7 March 2012. 
13 For details, see press release of the  Bank for International 
Settlements,  16  April  2012 
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authorisation  withdrawals)  to  be  applied  in  case  of 
breaches of the Regulation to legal and natural persons 
(Art. 65).
14 In light of the recent banking union project, 
authorisation of and sanctions against CSDs would fit 
more logically with the ECB, all the more so in the 
T2S context. 
In addition to specific operational requirements, such 
as daily reconciliation of the number of securities with 
the accounts, CSDs should segregate accounts of each 
participant and enable participants to segregate clients’ 
individual accounts (Art. 39). Cash settlement services 
in commercial bank money must be provided though a 
separate credit institution, as they are classified in the 
annex  of  the  proposal  as  ‘banking-type’  ancillary 
services. In effect, according to Art. 52, the provision 
of banking-type ancillary services by CSDs  must be 
carried  out  through  a  separate  credit  institution, 
although  an  exception  can  be  made  in  a  reasoned 
request  by  the  competent  authority  to  the  European 
Commission, an exception that was deleted in the draft 
European Parliament report.
15 This provision attempts 
to avoid risk  concentration and  limits the possibility 
that  conflicting  functions  and  interests  will  arise  by 
allowing a single entity to execute both pure settlement 
and pure banking services. The separate legal entity, 
however,  can  be  set  up  within  the  same  group. 
Authorities may even designate more than one credit 
institution  in  case  the  concentration  of  risks  is  too 
high. Fears that securities accounts will be misused to 
support  banking  activities  have  emerged  after  recent 
losses  of  clients’  assets  due  to  banking  activities 
carried  out  by  the  same  entity,  such  as  securities 
lending. Moving these services under a different legal 
entity  will  provide  a  clear  separation  between  pure 
settlement services and banking activities. At the same 
time, in combination with open-access rules, this move 
may increase competition with other entities providing 
value-added services across markets and CSDs. 
As CSDs will have to look downstream to expand their 
services with the arrival of T2S, they will come even 
more  in  direct  competition  with  custodian  banks,  as 
well as with firms providing middle-office services. In 
this  context,  the  current  phrasing  of  the  provision 
regarding banking services may cause uncertainty for 
CSDs, at least in the short-term, on the costs and future 
of  their  vertically  integrated  business  model.  The 
Commission may argue that this is only a legal cost, 
but  besides  additional  administrative  and  regulatory 
                                                   
14 Administrative fines can go up to 10% of total turnover of a 
legal entity or to 10% of total income of a natural person or to 
€5 million. The simultaneous use of a 10% threshold in some 
countries and a fixed €5 million threshold in others may still 
maintain substantial divergences among EU countries. 
15  European  Parliament,  Draft  Report  on  the  proposal  for  a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
improving securities settlement in the European Union and on 
central securities depositories (CSDs) and amending Directive 
98/26/EC, Rapporteur Kay Swinburne. 
costs (i.e. separate capital requirements), there is the 
issue  of lost  economies  of scale and scope resulting 
from  splitting  activities  across  several  entities.  The 
question  arises  whether  similar  rules  will  ceteris 
paribus  apply  to  custodian  banks  providing  other 
banking-type ancillary services. 
By mid-2012, almost all eurozone CSDs and six non-
eurozone  CSDs,  including  the  Swiss  CSD  SIX,  had 
signed up to T2S or announced their intention to do so, 
thereby  allowing  the  ECB  to  have  a  moderately 
favourable business case to go ahead.
16 According to 
the  2008  impact  assessment,  settlement  costs  could 
decline  by  approximately  30%  if  all  eurozone 
countries were to join (see Lannoo & Valiante, 2009). 
This will further decline when additional non-eurozone 
countries sign up, with the Nordic countries, part of the 
Euroclear  group,  already  having  announced  their 
intention  to  join  as  well.  The  Bank  of  England  has 
indicated, however, that it will  not participate  in the 
platform for sterling-denominated settlements. 
The  framework  agreement  for  those  CSDs  joining 
T2S, published in October 2011, runs over 700 pages, 
containing  54  articles,  divided  over  7  chapters.  It 
contains  amongst  other  things  the  pricing  for  the 
settlement  services  of  T2S,  which  has  constantly 
increased  after  the  first  estimates,  weakening  the 
original  business  case  made  by  the  ECB  (i.e.  an 
important reduction in settlement costs). The prices are 
now expected to vary between €0.40 and €0.60, which 
are on the higher end of the 2008 ECB business case 
(scenario 1 assumes all eurozone countries participate). 
Additionally,  as  we  pointed  out  in  our  earlier  work 
(Lannoo  &  Valiante,  2009),  T2S  will  also  force 
efficient  business  models  to  charge  more  than  what 
they  actually  charge  today  as  they  have  ‘agreed’  to 
migrate to the T2S infrastructure. 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the costs and the 
question of who ultimately bears the operational risks, 
the EU institution-driven settlement platform is trying 
to  succeed  where  market-driven  solutions  have  not 
been  able  to  progress  at  the  same  pace  due  to 
conflicting commercial interests, i.e. the creation of a 
harmonised framework for securities (and cash, with 
T2)  settlement  infrastructure.  As  a  result  of  this 
initiative, competition between CSDs and providers of 
related  services  (e.g.  global  custodians)  will  become 
harsher  on  value-added  services  and  potentially  on 
middle-office  services  as  well,  while  small  national 
players will gradually find themselves pushed out of 
the market. 
The EMIR revolution? 
The new rules, as always, provide costs and benefits 
for the market. As with MiFID after the 2004 adoption, 
much debate focused on costs, but the dynamic effects 
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of  the  new  rules  on  technological  investments  to 
compete  in  the  new  market  environment  are  often 
underestimated.  For  end  users,  whether  financial  or 
non-financial  institutions,  the  costs  of  collateral  will 
certainly increase, at least in the short term – the Tabb 
Group (2011) estimated the need for collateral to be 
around $2 trillion.
17 Over $3.7 trillion collateral is in 
circulation today and 84% of all OTC derivatives have 
collateral  agreements  in  place  (ISDA,  2012),  but 
uncollateralised  OTC  derivatives  exposure  is  still  a 
considerable  part  of  the  market.
18  Roughly  $100 
trillion  of  OTC  derivatives  contracts  (as  notional 
value) do not have any collateral agreement in place, 
but  collateralisation  is  growing  at  a  fast  pace.  The 
creation  of  a  modern  and  flexible  infrastructure  that 
optimises  the  use  of  collateral  and  allows  offering 
diversified services for end users is essential for this 
process  to  succeed.  This  situation,  on  the  one  side, 
creates  a  lot  of  opportunities  for  the  industry  to 
develop,  through  new  technologies,  competitive 
services such as real-time risk management services, or 
cross-asset  classes  clearing.  On  the  other  side,  it 
clashes  with  commercial  interests  that  impede 
initiatives  to  make  collateral  pools  more  fungible  to 
promote  interoperable  clearing  platforms  with  other 
CCPs (mainly through cross-margining agreements).  
By setting risk-management procedures among CCPs 
and instituting strict day-to-day supervision under the 
ESMA-ECB  umbrella,  an  interoperable  environment 
would  certainly  deliver  better  collateral  management 
and huge savings for end users, a key element for the 
creation of a truly pan-European infrastructure. EMIR 
is very timid in this area and it sees interoperability as 
a threat for the stability of the CCP (interoperability 
will only be limited to ‘cash securities’). However, the 
lack of fungible collateral pools would itself be a threat 
to the efficiency of the market as it could create costly 
sealed CCP operations, which are going to increase the 
need for collateral. In effect, two CCPs on both sides 
of the same transaction may ask for the same amount 
of collateral, which will represent a costly duplication. 
In an interoperable framework, once risk-management 
procedures are fixed and well-supervised, competition 
among  CCPs  would  move  to  value-added  services 
linked to collateral management, inter alia. In any case, 
EMIR  will  lead  to  investments  in  new  clearing 
technologies, as the current clearing technology is not 
scalable or flexible enough to handle the changes that 
are coming (Tabb Group, 2011). As a result of better 
technology,  moving  potentially  to  almost  real-time 
clearing  will  increase  transaction  volumes  and 
liquidity,  as  well  as  the  size  of  the  pie  for  market 
participants that enter the arena. Shortening settlement 
                                                   
17  The  Bank  of  England  estimates  that  the  cost  of  margin 
requirements for clearing of interest rate derivatives amounts to 
about £ 500 bn. See Bank of England (2012). 
18 The European Commission (2010) estimated this exposure 
roughly to $1.4 trillion, but it is likely to be much higher. 
cycles will also free up more capital, which can then 
be redeployed to improve market efficiency. 
In addition to the implications for clearing and CCP 
business, the cost of membership in and reporting to 
TRs should also be considered. EMIR, in effect, offers 
huge  opportunities  for  TRs  too,  and  the  expected 
volume increase in traded and cleared derivatives will 
further stimulate their  growth. Existing  organisations 
in  clearing,  trading  and  data  reporting  may  benefit 
from  this  change,  provided  they  make  the  necessary 
adaptations. 
For  this  to  happen,  competition  between  CCPs  will 
need to be strengthened, and interoperability will also 
need to be enforced in the exchange-traded derivatives 
(ETD) space. Today, the duopoly of Deutsche Börse-
NYSE  controls  more  than  90%  of  the  European 
exchange-traded  derivatives  market.  Synergies  with 
ETD  may  expand  oligopolistic  settings  in  adjacent 
markets  (‘cross-subsidisation’),  such  as  the  unlisted 
OTC  derivatives  clearing  space.  Access  to  the 
respective CCPs by competing trading venues and to 
the  incumbent  trading  venue  by  competing  CCPs 
(reverse open access) is constrained because of closed 
vertical silos, i.e. there is no direct access to the data 
feed  of  the  incumbent  trading  venue  by  competing 
CCPs and no possibility for competing trading venues 
to send trade data to the incumbent CCP. This lack of 
competition may further limit growth and innovation 
in the EU’s derivatives markets. Compared to the US, 
where  anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  the  market 
grew  by  35%,  the  EU’s  exchange  traded  derivatives 
market has been rather stagnant. This is also why the 
European Commission prohibited the merger between 
the two entities, which would have “created a quasi-
monopoly  in  a  number  of  asset  classes,  leading  to 
significant harm to derivatives users and the European 
economy  as  a  whole.  With  no  effective  competitive 
constraint  left  in  the  market,  the  benefits  of  price 
competition  would  be  taken  away  from  customers. 
There would also be less innovation in an area where a 
competitive market is vital for both SMEs and larger 
firms.”
19  The  implementation  of  EMIR  should  bring 
more  competition  in  these  markets,  while  allowing 
European  competition  policy  authorities  to  better 
monitor markets. 
Conclusions 
With a delay of more than 10 years, the EU is finally 
going to have a regulatory framework in place for the 
post-trade  financial  market  infrastructure.  In  the 
context  of  the  financial  crisis,  this  regulatory 
                                                   
19  The  European  Commission  blocked  the  proposed  merger 
between  Deutsche  Börse  and  NYSE  Euronext  after  the 
companies’ refusal to apply tough conditions and sell the part 
of their businesses that was creating strong concentration (see 
press  release,  1  February  2012,  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-12-94_en.htm?locale=en). 8 |Lannoo & Valiante 
framework follows two important trends. On the one 
hand, there is the general mandate given by the G-20 
to  regulators  to  strengthen  financial  stability,  mainly 
through  transparency  and  mandatory  use  of  highly 
standardised infrastructures. On the other hand, since 
the  launch  of  the  Financial  Services  Action  Plan  in 
1999, Europe has been trying to build a pan-European 
infrastructure  leveraging  on  healthy  competition 
among  national  incumbent  infrastructures  and  new 
pan-European competitors. Competition is what indeed 
has kept the single market so far together and given it 
shape.  Europe  should  continue  to  work  to  ensure 
stability  without  compromising  the  higher-level  goal 
of  greater  integration  through  competition  at  pan-
European level, and common market architecture with 
common  minimum  standards  through  more  effective 
on-going supervision and enforcement. Any attempt by 
market operators to impede competition along the long 
value  chain  of  financial  market  infrastructure  on 
unfounded  grounds  of  risks  for  financial  stability 
should be considered as an attack on the single market. 
It cannot be denied, however, that profitability will go 
down  drastically  for  the  business  model  of  market 
infrastructures.  Due  to  fiercer  competition,  revenues 
may  go  down  even  further;  therefore,  in  order  to 
remain  commercially  viable,  they  need  to  integrate 
their  businesses  vertically  (greater  consolidation 
among  trading,  clearing  and  settlement  providers  is 
already part of the process) and horizontally to create 
economies of scale (size) and scope (services).  
EMIR, in particular on the clearing side, may instigate 
a sea change, since a new market has to be structured 
for  central  clearing  of  previously  bilaterally-traded 
derivative  contracts.  Huge  investments  have  been 
made and are still to come in clearing technology and 
value-added  services,  which  will  bring  important 
changes in the coming years. Existing CCPs will see 
huge  opportunities for growth, and  new ones can be 
expected  to  emerge.  On  the  settlement  side,  free 
competition  between  CSDs  may  lead  to  further 
concentration  and  vertical  consolidation  within  the 
sector, as this  is a scale business by  excellence, but 
also to greater competition with specialised banks for 
the expansion of territory. With growing concentration 
in the clearing and settlement sector, the task for macro 
and  prudential  supervisors  will  not  become  easier. 
However,  as  long  as  the  regulatory  and  supervisory 
frameworks ensure that these integrated infrastructures 
are  sufficiently  interoperable,  i.e.  open  at  each  key 
juncture  of  their  value  chain  (trading,  clearing  and 
settlement),  the  process  of  ‘pan-Europeanisation’  of 
the  market  infrastructure  will  continue  and  be 
beneficial  for  financial  integration.  Locking-in 
collateral  and  customers  in  vertical  and  non-
interoperable  market  infrastructures  may  also  have 
spill-over effects on trading flows, by distorting flows 
from  non-vertically  integrated  infrastructures.  In  the 
short-term,  this  may  generate  predatory  practices  by 
vertically  integrated  and  non-interoperable  market 
infrastructures to push infrastructures that are unable to 
ring-fence collateral pools with post-trading operations 
out of the market. This may drive further consolidation 
but  with  limited  benefits  in  terms  of  efficiency,  as 
these pools of collateral will be unable (and unwilling) 
to interact. 
A problem on the supervisory side is the multiplicity 
of actors: on the European level alone, three different 
bodies  are  in  charge  –  the  ECB  (and  other  central 
banks),  ESMA  and  EBA  –  with  licensing  and 
supervision  still  in  the  hands  of  local  authorities, 
contrary  to  the  initial  plan.  With  the  banking  union 
project firmly under construction, a more streamlined 
structure will be necessary, given also that it concerns 
only a few players of systemic importance. In addition, 
close  cooperation  between  the  two  major  European 
supervisors, the ECB and the Bank of England, will be 
required, in the form of an MoU to structure control. 
Finally, more light should be shed on the implications 
of forthcoming market infrastructure regulation on the 
availability of collateral (total volumes), in particular 
on  the  possibility  for  this  collateral  and  assets,  if 
segregated in individual client accounts by CCPs and 
for settlement and custody by CSDs, to be re-used for 
other purposes (re-hypothecation) or to limit its re-use 
by  the  infrastructure/intermediary.  Based  on  our 
conservative estimates, the securities lending and repo 
markets  in  Europe  have  exceeded  more  than  €6 
trillion.
20 In the end, much will also depend on how 
each CCP will draft the ‘right of use’ procedures in the 
use of collateral, in line with the guidelines set by Art. 
47 on the investment policy of a CCP (and Art. 52.1 on 
risk  management  procedures  with  interoperability 
agreements). The  entire  financial system  depends  on 
the  integrity  and  turnover  of  collateral  channels 
(Sissoko, 2011; Singh & Stella, 2012), on which the 
market has leveraged and grown so rapidly in the last 
decade.  Any  change  with  the  potential  to  generate 
indirect  effects  on  the  architecture  of  the  financial 
system should be subject to an in-depth investigation 
and testing period to assess unintended effects and new 
sources of systemic risk. 
   
                                                   
20  Authors’  estimates  based  on  data  from  International 
Securities  Lending  Association  and  International  Capital 
Markets Association. Prospects & challenges of a pan-European post-trade infrastructure |9 
 
References  
Bank  of  England  (2012),  Financial  Stability  Report, 
June. 
Benito,  Jesus  (2012),  “The  role  of  market 
infrastructures  in  OTC  derivative  markets”, 
Journal of securities operations and custody, Vol. 
4, No. 4. 
CPSS-IOSCO & BIS (2012), “Principles for financial 
market  infrastructures”,  April 
(http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss101a.pdf). 
Deutsche  Bank  (2012),  Global  Derivatives  Reform 
Progress to date, June. 
European  Banking  Authority  (EBA)  (2012),  “Draft 
Regulatory  Technical  Standards  on  capital 





European  Council  and  the  Parliament  (2012),  EU 
Regulation  No.  648/2012  on  OTC  derivatives, 
central  counterparties  and  trade  repositories 
(EMIR), 4 July.  
European Commission (2010), “Impact Assessment on 
EMIR”,  SEC(2010)  1058/2  (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/financial-markets/docs/ 
derivatives/20100915_impact_assessment_en.pdf). 
European  Commission  (2012),  “Proposal  for  a 
Regulation  on  improving  securities  settlement  in 
the  European  Union  and  on  central  securities 
depositories  (CSDs)  and  amending  Directive 
98/26/EC”  (available  at  http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/financial-markets/ 
central_securities_depositories_en.htm#proposal).  
European  Securities  and  Markets  Authority  (ESMA) 
(2012),  Final  Report  on  EMIR  Draft  Technical 
Standards,  ESMA/2012/600,  27  September.  
 
International  Swaps  and  Derivatives  Association 




Lannoo, Karel and Diego Valiante (2009), “Integrating 
Europe’s  Back  Office:  10  years  of  turning  in 
circles”,  ECMI  Policy  Brief  No.  13,  European 
Capital Markets Institute, Brussels, June. 
LCH  Clearnet  (2012),  “LCH.Clearnet  regulatory 
capital  update;  results  of  ESMA/EBA 
consultation”,  28  September 
(http://www.lchclearnet.com/media_centre/ 
press_releases/2012-09-28.asp).  
Singh,  Manmohan  (2011),  “Velocity  of  pledged 
collateral”,  IMF  Working  Paper,  International 
Monetary  Fund,  Washington,  D.C.,  November 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1
1256.pdf).  
Singh,  Manmohan  and  Peter  Stella  (2012),  “Money 
and  Collateral”,  IMF  Working  Paper  No.  12/95, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 
Sissoko,  Carolyn  (2011),  “The  legal  foundations  of 
financial  collapse”  (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1525120).  
Tabb  Group  (2011),  “OTC  Derivatives  Clearing 
Technology:  Bringing  the  Back  Office  to  the 
Forefront”, September. 
Valiante,  Diego  (2010),  “Shaping  Reforms  and 
Business Models for the OTC Derivatives Market: 
Quo  vadis?”,  ECMI  Research  Report  No.  5, 






















www.eurocapitalmarkets.org | info@eurocapitalmarkets.org 










CEPS’  funding  is  obtained  from  a  variety  of  sources,  including  membership  fees,  project  research,  foundation 
grants, conferences fees, publication sales and an annual grant from the European Commission. 
 
  
 
www.ceps.eu 
 